DIPLOMACY OVER MILITARY: INDO-CHINA RELATIONS
Over time, there has been a lot of uncertainty about the latest face-off between India and China in Ladakh. Chinese instances have been identified at multiple points along the boundary. Words such as "Line of Actual Control," "Claim Line," "International Border," and more tossed over loosely. I will clear up some of this misunderstanding in this section and put the events in their proper sense.
At first, it is necessary to know that there is no direct border separating India from China in many sectors. There are just different lines of argument and different interpretations of where the working boundary — the line of actual control — is located. Also, there is no formal "agreement" on what such definitions are. The Chinese side has previously declined to even exchange maps showing the opposing statements. In the area, there are different statements and beliefs. This creates conflicting claims. There is a smaller zone within it, which is patrolled by both sides. It can be better illustrated in the image shown below.
Image Courtesy: News Laundry
Both countries have different statements about where the LAC lies. There is a grey-desolate area between the two countries, and this region is known as the "area of differing perceptions (ADPA)" as we have about 10 km of ADPA near Pangong Lake in Ladakh.
After China learned that the Indian army has been fitted with the new weapons technology, there has been constant conflict over the region. What is going on in Galwan Valley over the last few months is nothing new, as the same situation was seen earlier in 1962, which later took the shape of an Indo-China war.
The key problem with China is the five finger (shown in the picture below) as these five fingers are the five separate points on which India and China had their dispute on claiming it to be their own regardless of whether they come under ADPA, as finger one and two are up and the path to them is a little difficult to hit so that the disputes often happen at finger three, four and five, which also come under ADPA, which is like a strong person battling with a very poor or ill guy, so this is something of a negative effect on any country's army, and now, because of all this, a trade-off diplomatic war has begun between India and China.
With all this happening, it can be argued that this is a psychological issue rather than a military factor on the part of China and the key reason behind the construction of this psychological problem is the latest Indian war equipment.
Image Courtesy: Cloud Front
During a conversation with General Joginder Jaswant Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, (Retd), who was the 22nd Chief of the Indian Army Staff. Gen JJ Singh was also the former governor of the state of Arunachal Pradesh and addressed some of the main issues about the new China, or as people now call it, Xi Jinping's China. Xi Jinping's China, he added, which we are now dealing with, has the stamp of his 'main thoughts' on 'socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new age'. The ambitious goals may now be difficult to achieve due to the effects of the coronavirus pandemic and the risk of rising border tensions. Besides this, consideration must be given to the impact on the Chinese economy due to anti-China sentiment and the boycott of Chinese products and apps. The continued face-off in Ladakh, where the Chinese have not yet emptied the transgressions, is, in my opinion, likely to be a long haul, and neither side seems ready to embrace it at present. The Indians have sent a clear message to China that it will not budge until the status quo ante as established in April 2020 is finally restored. At last, we seemed to have learned to some degree the language that the Chinese understand-strong is valued.
The deficit of confidence is at an all-time high, owing to China's hostile overtures and behaviour. China pushed a divisional force with guns, cannons, rockets, and attempted to capture dominant ground along the LAC. The swift and robust response of the Indian Army stopped them in their tracks. The world did not accept its ludicrous claim that the Indian powers were the provocateurs. This inadequacy of knowledge in reading the Chinese mind has yet to be resolved, he says. We need to build the capacity to predict and anticipate China's intended and offensive concepts. It's time for our intelligence services to make a [i]wake-up call. Our leaders need to be knowledgeable enough to recognize and negotiate with China. India has effectively communicated to China that its firm response to Doklam and Galwan will not be a psychological burden. We have to tackle areas of the security vulnerability, says Ravi Agrawal. For the next five years, he said, we need to increase our defence budget to approximately 3 % of GDP. Any provocation or mishap will be military, economic and political expense prohibitively, he said. Towards the end, Gen JJ Singh claimed that India's aggression would cost diplomatically, economically and politically prohibitively. India is inspired to do this today.